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Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City
of San Francisco: How the Ninth Circuit Abandoned
Judicial Neutrality to Strike a Blow at Religion
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, America has seen an ongoing
conflict between advocates of gay rights and supporters of traditional
religion.1 This conflict, one of many fronts in the “culture war,” as it
has sometimes been called,2 has raged in many different contexts
through the years.3 In the political arena and in the courts, religion
and the gay movement have battled intensely over issues such as
treatment of homosexuality in public schools, portrayal of
homosexuality in media,4 and, more recently, gay marriage and the
adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples.5 Because the
conflict involves differing views about some of the most fundamental
societal ideals and values,6 local governments have sometimes felt the
need to step into the debate. Such involvement presents particularly
difficult questions in trying to balance the free-speech interests of the
government with the First Amendment protections afforded
religious institutions.7
On June 3, 2009, in Catholic League for Religious and Civil
Rights v. City of San Francisco,8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether a San
Francisco city resolution denouncing a Vatican order not to place
adoptive children with same-sex couples was forbidden under the
1. George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom,
95 KY. L.J. 553, 555 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Noonan, J., dissenting).
3. Dent, supra note 1, at 555.
4. Id.
5. See Jason Scott, One State, Two State; Red State, Blue State: An Analysis of LGBT
Equal Rights, 77 UMKC L. REV. 513, 517–18 (2008).
6. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
42 (1991).
7. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 394 (1994).
8. 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Applying the Lemon
test, an analysis commonly used by courts in Establishment Clause
cases, the Ninth Circuit found that the resolution passed
constitutional scrutiny, despite Catholic League’s contention that the
city was expressing disapproval of Catholicism in violation of the
Constitution.9 This Note will argue that the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly decided the case by applying an inherently problematic
test, conducting an outcome-driven analysis, and ignoring the
correct standard of review. In so doing, the court has arguably
sacrificed its required neutrality.
This Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Catholic
League and explain how the court’s neutrality was compromised.
Part II of the Note presents a summary of the facts and procedural
history of the case. Part III then provides some context for the issues
involved by discussing the background First Amendment
Establishment Clause jurisprudence leading up to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision. Part IV describes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and
decision in Catholic League in detail, and Part V analyzes that
decision to explain how the Ninth Circuit went wrong. Finally, Part
VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March of 2006, the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco
adopted a non-binding resolution concerning the Catholic Church’s
position against adoptions of children by same-sex couples.10 The
resolution, entitled “Resolution urging Cardinal Levada to withdraw
his directive to Catholic Charities forbidding the placement of
children in need of adoption with same-sex couples,” aimed harsh
language at both the Vatican and Prefect Cardinal William Levada,
who was the head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
at the Vatican.11 Passed in response to a then-recent directive from
Cardinal Levada instructing the Archdiocese of San Francisco that
Catholic social services agencies should not place children in need of

9. Id. at 597.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 597–98. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is an official body
within the Catholic Church tasked with promoting and safeguarding the doctrine on faith and
morals throughout the Catholic world. Id.
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adoption with gay or lesbian couples,12 the full text of the resolution
read as follows:
Resolution urging Cardinal William Levada, in his capacity as head
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican, to
withdraw his discriminatory and defamatory directive that Catholic
Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco stop placing children
in need of adoption with homosexual households.
WHEREAS, It is an insult to all San Franciscans when a foreign
country, like the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively
influence this great City’s existing and established customs and
traditions such as the right of same-sex couples to adopt and care
for children in need; and
WHEREAS, The statements of Cardinal Levada and the Vatican
that “Catholic agencies should not place children for adoption in
homosexual households,” and “Allowing children to be adopted by
persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence
to these children”13 are absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry of
San Francisco; and
WHEREAS, Such hateful and discriminatory rhetoric is both
insulting and callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and
ignorance which has seldom been encountered by this Board of
Supervisors; and
WHEREAS, Same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as
are heterosexual couples; and
WHEREAS, Cardinal Levada is a decidedly unqualified
representative of his former home city, and of the people of San
Francisco and the values they hold dear; and
WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors urges Archbishop
Niederauer and the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San
Francisco to defy all discriminatory directives of Cardinal Levada;
now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges Cardinal
William Levada, in his capacity as head of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican (formerly known as Holy
Office of the Inquisition), to withdraw his discriminatory and
12. Id. at 598.
13. This language was allegedly taken from a 2003 document issued by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, entitled “Considerations Regarding Proposals to
Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons.” Id.
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defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of
San Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with
homosexual households.14

Not long after the Board adopted this resolution, Catholic
League filed suit, claiming that the resolution violated the
Establishment Clause by expressing hostility and disapproval towards
the Catholic Church and its religious tenets.15 Catholic League
sought nominal damages, a declaration that the resolution was
unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction enjoining the
resolution and other official resolutions, pronouncements, or
declarations against Catholics and their religious beliefs.16 The Board
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district
court granted that motion.17 Catholic League then appealed from
the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.18
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,”19 and the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies that prohibition to governments of the states.20
There is general agreement that the basic principle behind the
Establishment Clause is separation of church and state. However,
interpretation of the Establishment Clause by the courts has
historically been ambiguous, leaving current jurisprudence in a
“confused state.”21 The United States Supreme Court has applied a
number of different criteria and tests in analyzing Establishment
Clause cases over the years, none of which has been deemed
controlling in every case.22
The Supreme Court has clearly stated, however, that “the ‘First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
14. Id. at 597–98 (footnote not in original).
15. Id. at 598.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 599.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 408 (2009).
21. Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to Play: Toward a More
Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006).
22. See id. at 8–9.
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religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”23 This requirement
of neutrality means that government conduct towards religion “must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it
constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.”24 As the
Ninth Circuit noted in its Catholic League opinion, the majority of
Establishment Clause cases brought before the courts have dealt with
questions of whether governmental endorsement of religion exists.25
The courts rarely need to determine whether government actions
have effected a “disapproval of religion.”26 Nevertheless, it has long
been recognized that “[government] may not establish a ‘religion of
secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility
to religion.”27
Because government disapproval cases are rare, the Ninth Circuit
had relatively little precedent to follow in deciding the Catholic
League case; however, two cases were particularly important in the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The first, Lemon v. Kurtzman,28 sets forth
the well-known Lemon test as one possible analysis to be used in
evaluating Establishment Clause cases. The second, American Family
Ass’n v. City of San Francisco,29 is a more recent Ninth Circuit case
involving the application of the Lemon test to a question of
government disapproval. Both of these cases are discussed briefly in
turn.
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court considered whether
two state statutes that provided government aid to church-related
schools violated the Establishment Clause. One of the statutes gave
funding to nonpublic schools for the cost of teachers’ salaries and

23. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
24. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
25. See Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567
F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2009).
26. Id.
27. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
28. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
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supplies.30 The other granted teachers in nonpublic schools a
supplement equal to part of their salaries.31
In evaluating the constitutionality of those statutes, the Supreme
Court used an analysis that has become known as the Lemon test.
Under the Lemon test, government action will pass scrutiny if it
meets three conditions. First, the action must have a secular
purpose.32 Second, its primary effect must not be to advance or to
inhibit religion.33 Finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”34 If a government action
fails any of those conditions, the Lemon test declares the action to be
unconstitutional.35
Applying the test in Lemon, the Supreme Court determined that
the challenged statutes could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
According to the Court, the statutes passed the first condition of
having a secular purpose because they were intended to enhance the
quality of secular education.36 The Court found it unnecessary to
decide whether the statutes had the primary effect of advancing
religion under the second condition, however, because the statutes
failed the third and final part of the test by causing excessive
entanglement between government and religion.37
The Lemon test has survived several decades as an important test
in Establishment Clause cases; however, it is not the only test the
Supreme Court has used.38 In fact, the Court has stated that the
Lemon test’s three criteria are “no more than helpful signposts.”39
Nevertheless, it was the test the Ninth Circuit chose to apply in
American Family Ass’n v. City of San Francisco.

30. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971).
31. Id. at 607.
32. Id. at 612.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 613.
35. Id. at 612–13.
36. Id. at 613.
37. Id. at 613–14.
38. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 485–87 (9th Cir. 2003) (summarizing
several tests that the Supreme Court has applied in various Establishment Clause cases,
including the “endorsement test” and the “coercion test”).
39. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
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B. American Family Ass’n v. City of San Francisco

In 1998, several religious groups joined together to sponsor an
advertising campaign aimed at reaching out to members of the
homosexual community.40 The coalition placed an advertisement in a
San Francisco newspaper which stated, among other things, that
homosexuality is a sin that can be overcome with the help of Jesus
Christ.41 The advertisement also expressed a desire to help
homosexuals avoid the physical and emotional health risks associated
with such behavior.42
Not long after the advertisement appeared in the paper, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors sent a letter to the religious groups,
denouncing their “hateful rhetoric” and claiming that “there is a
direct correlation between [their] acts of discrimination . . . and the
horrible crimes committed against gays and lesbians.”43 The Board
also adopted two resolutions that alleged the groups’ advertisements
to be “erroneous and full of lies,” and to be encouraging of
oppression and violence toward gays and lesbians.44 The Board’s
angry response to the advertisement prompted the religious groups
to bring a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional government hostility
towards religion.45
In addressing the religious groups’ allegations, the Ninth Circuit
applied the Lemon test. Although acknowledging that it had mostly
been used in cases involving government giving preference to
religion, the court said the Lemon test “accommodates the analysis of
a claim brought under a hostility to religion theory as well.”46
Analyzing the purpose factor of the test, the court found that a
plausible secular purpose to protect homosexuals from violence
existed in the Board’s actions.47 The court further found that the
primary effect of those actions was to send a message promoting
equality for gays and discouraging hate crimes against them.48
40.
2002).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1119–20.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
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Finally, the court said the entanglement factor did not fit very well
with the circumstances of the case and clearly did not present a
serious issue.49 Thus, the religious groups had no case.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
Seven years after American Family Ass’n, the Ninth Circuit’s
three-judge panel in Catholic League also affirmed the district court’s
ruling in favor of the San Francisco Board, holding that the
controversial Board resolution did not violate the Establishment
Clause.50 In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit followed the
analysis it employed in its American Family Ass’n decision.51 As it
had done in the prior case, the Ninth Circuit chose to apply the
Lemon test, and conducted an analysis of whether the resolution
violated any of that test’s three conditions.52 What follows is a brief
summary of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and analysis, as well as
Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion.
A. Purpose
In applying the Lemon test, the Ninth Circuit first considered
whether the Board’s action of adopting the resolution had a secular
purpose. Seeking to make this determination from the standpoint of
an objective observer, the court first turned to the resolution’s text.
Although the court acknowledged the strong language of the
resolution, it also noted that both the title and preamble seemed to
state a purpose to denounce discrimination in adoption.53
Additionally, the court said, this same secular theme was interwoven
throughout the resolution.54 Turning its attention to timing, the
court next pointed out that the resolution was adopted within a
short period after Cardinal Levada issued his directive to Catholic
Charities.55 If the Board were trying to attack Catholic beliefs, the
court suggested, it would have done so years before, when the

49. Id. at 1123.
50. Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567 F.3d
595, 608 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2009).
51. Id. at 599.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 601.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 601–02.
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Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith had initially voiced its
opposition to legalization of gay and lesbian unions.56 Given the fact
that it did not do so, the court found it reasonable to think that the
Board was simply responding to the adoption issue, focusing on the
secular impact the Catholic policy would have on same-sex couples
in the city.57
The court also recognized in its analysis that what the Board may
have considered to be a secular purpose, Catholic League considered
hostile to Catholic religious tenets.58 Issues touching upon
homosexuality are inherently difficult because they can involve the
overlap of secular and religious interests, but the court said that “the
government is not stripped of its secular purpose simply because the
same concept can be construed as religious.”59
B. Effect
After determining that the Board had a secular purpose in
adopting the resolution, the Ninth Circuit once again looked
through the lens of the objective observer to examine the
resolution’s actual effect. Here, however, the court thought it
essential to use a “sufficiently broad lens.”60 While acknowledging
that even a non-binding resolution could have the effect of
conveying a hostile symbolic message, the court nevertheless
emphasized that it is not enough that one might simply infer
disapproval of Catholic religious tenets as one of the resolution’s
messages; rather, a message of disapproval must be the primary
effect.61
According to the court, a person viewing the resolution as a
whole, having an understanding of its context and unique
circumstances, would not conclude that the primary effect of the
resolution was religious.62 Pointing to statements in the resolution
that could be taken as hostile to Catholic religious beliefs, the court
said such statements “do[] not stand alone,” but rather are
“embedded in the larger Resolution which is primarily a defense of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 605 n.11.
Id. at 606–07.
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same-sex adoption.”63 Additionally, San Francisco’s “tradition of
promoting and defending same-sex relationships,” as well as the
Board’s “extensive and persistent practice of passing non-binding
resolutions denouncing discrimination against gays and lesbians,” led
the court to decide that an objective observer would understand the
Board’s intent to defend the rights of same-sex families;64 therefore,
the effect of the resolution would not be primarily religious.
C. Entanglement
The third and final step in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was to
consider whether the resolution fostered excessive governmental
entanglement with religion. Catholic League argued that the
resolution failed this part of the test by taking an “official position on
religious doctrine,” thus taking sides in a religious matter.65 The
Ninth Circuit, however, was not persuaded. It concluded that the
resolution was simply an expression of the Board’s secular view on
same-sex adoption, a matter of public policy.66 Additionally, despite
Catholic League’s contention that the resolution attempted to
influence Church authority and meddle in Church affairs, the court
noted that the Board did not attempt to codify or regulate beliefs in
any way; thus, it did not cross the line of excessive entanglement.67
That the resolution was non-binding was important to this
conclusion.
D. Judge Berzon’s Concurring Opinion
Although the three-judge panel was unanimous in its decision
that the resolution passed the Lemon test, Judge Berzon found the
result “troublesome.”68 Recognizing that the resolutions in Catholic
League and American Family are “near—if not at—the line” that
separates establishment of a policy condemning religious beliefs,
Judge Berzon wrote a brief, but significant, concurring opinion in
which she offered a few “caveats” that she thought should be

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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attached to the court’s Catholic League decision.69 First, Judge
Berzon said, it was significant that the resolution did not call for any
regulation; it was mere governmental speech.70 Second, it appeared
that the resolution was not broadcast to the public other than
through the Board’s enactment of it.71 It had not been advertised,
displayed prominently, or broadcast in any other “more intrusive and
permanent way.”72 And finally, the resolution was “not repeated or
pervasive, but discrete.”73
According to Judge Berzon, if any one of these three factors
were different, the case may have come out differently.74 But because
the resolution appeared to be “passed but then left dormant,” it
probably did not pervade public perception of Catholicism and
therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause.75
V. ANALYSIS
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Catholic League more
closely resembled taking sides in the culture war than in neutrally
applying the law to the facts of the case. Because the court applied an
inherently problematic test, employed an outcome-driven analysis,
and ignored the appropriate legal standard, it reached an incorrect
conclusion and decision.
A. The Flawed Lemon Test
The first mistake the court made was in choosing to use the
Lemon test. As mentioned previously, application of the Lemon test is
not mandatory. The Ninth Circuit seemed to use it largely to be
consistent with its prior decision in American Family Ass’n.76
However, there are significant neutrality problems with the Lemon
test, as constitutional scholars have recognized for years.77 A number

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
77. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing works of various constitutional scholars “who have
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of current and former Supreme Court justices have criticized the
test,78 and the Supreme Court has sometimes declined to use it,
choosing instead to apply other standards it has deemed more
appropriate.79
One of the main criticisms of the Lemon test has been that the
distinctions courts make when applying the test are difficult to
discern.80 The test has sometimes been used as a convenient weapon
to strike down practices with which the courts disagree, and it has
not been consistently applied in all circumstances.81 For example, the
Tenth Circuit has held that the depiction of a Christian cross in one
corner of a city seal failed the Lemon test because of its unmistakable
religious significance and the city’s pervasive use of the seal, even
though the seal allegedly symbolized the city’s unique history and
heritage.82 The next year, the same court held that statutes requiring
the printing of “In God we trust” on U.S. currency were valid under
the Lemon test’s requirements.83
It has also been suggested that the Lemon test is particularly
unsuitable for use in cases involving government disapproval, as
opposed to endorsement, of religion.84 One reason for this opinion is
that government can easily mask a hostile act by construing it to have
a legitimate secular purpose.85 Another possible reason, among
others, may be that the primary-effects factor of the test does not
lend itself to easy application and can easily be confused with and
rely upon the purpose-prong analysis. Thus, if the court finds a

criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines
and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced.”).
78. See id. at 398–99 (identifying opinions of six Supreme Court Justices who have
“personally driven pencils through the [Lemon test] creature’s heart,” mostly in response to the
test’s ad hoc application).
79. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (“Whatever may be the fate
of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not
useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol
grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our
Nation's history.”).
80. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 419 (2009).
81. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 419 (2009) (citing Robinson v. City of
Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995)).
83. Id. (citing Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996)).
84. See Andrew R. Cogar, Note, Government Hostility to Religion: How Misconstruction
of the Establishment Clause Stifles Religious Freedom, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 279, 307–08 (2002).
85. See id. at 309.
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convincing secular purpose, it may be inclined to see a primarily
secular effect as well. The Ninth Circuit should have taken the
opportunity in Catholic League to address these flaws of the Lemon
test in the present setting before blindly applying the test.
B. An Outcome-Driven Analysis
Because the Lemon test too easily makes it possible to apply an
analysis that is oriented to fit a desired outcome, it is not surprising
that the Ninth Circuit failed to neutrally apply the law to the facts in
Catholic League. That the court employed this kind of outcomedriven analysis is especially evident in light of how its opinion
compares with previous ones. For example, despite a significant
amount of harsh, angry language directed at the Catholic religion in
the resolution adopted by the Board, the court insisted that such
language was not the essence of the resolution; rather, the purpose
and primary effects of the resolution were secular, and the hostile
language had to be viewed in context.86 However, although this
analysis may be mostly in line with the reasoning of American Family
Ass’n, it does not square well with the court’s controversial Pledge of
Allegiance decision in Newdow v. Congress,87 where it ruled that a
mere two words, “under God,” were enough to fail under the Lemon
test.88 In fact, in that case, the court rejected the idea that it should
look at the Pledge “as a whole,” declaring that it need only consider
the original legislation that added the two words to the pledge.89
The court’s overall treatment of the primary-effects prong of the
Lemon test also seemed particularly outcome-driven in Catholic
League. In that section of the opinion, the court sought to ascertain
the primary effect of the resolution by determining whether it could
reasonably be construed as “sending primarily a message of . . .
86. Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567 F.3d
595, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2009).
87. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002).
88. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). This original opinion of the
Ninth Circuit was later amended and reprinted; and in the second version the court reached
the same result but removed its Lemon test analysis, finding it unnecessary due to the results of
its application of the “coercion test.” Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Newdow was reversed.
The reversal was based on the plaintiff’s lack of prudential standing, however, so the Supreme
Court never reached the merits of the case. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004).
89. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 610.
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disapproval.”90 However, the court’s reasoning in making that
determination largely mirrored its purpose-prong reasoning, raising
the question of whether the court confused the two. For one thing,
the court placed significant weight on the resolution’s “focus” of
promoting and defending homosexual relationships.91 The court also
looked to the Board’s historically “extensive and persistent practice
of passing non-binding resolutions denouncing discrimination
against gays and lesbians,” speculating that an objective observer
would have understood as much and not taken an anti-religious
message from the resolution.92 It has been observed, however, that
“[a]n effect is a result, not a reason.”93 While the Board’s focus and
history may be indicative of its purpose, it is hard to understand how
the court was able to use those factors to derive the primary effects
of the resolution. Either the court was confused, or it simply saw
what it wanted to see.
C. Ignoring the Correct Review Standard
Just as significant as the Ninth Circuit’s results-oriented
application of the Lemon test was its failure to adhere to the
appropriate legal standard for review in Catholic League. As noted
previously, the underlying issue being reviewed on appeal was
whether the district court was correct in granting the Board’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.94 The court clearly understood
the legal standard it was to apply, because it stated that it must
“accept the allegations in the complaint as true” and “draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”95 However, the court
proceeded to ignore that standard in its subsequent analysis. Judge
Noonan, dissenting in American Family Ass’n, had essentially the
same complaint. He noted that the court, in that case, did not draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the religious groups as it was
required to do.96 For example, the court brushed off the strong

90. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 604 (quoting Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d
1385, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994)).
91. Id. at 605.
92. Id. at 606.
93. Cogar, supra note 84, at 313.
94. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 598–99.
95. Id. at 599.
96. Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir.
2002) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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language of the Board’s letter and resolutions that asserted the
message of the religious groups to be directly correlated with
violence against homosexuals, suggesting that an objective observer
would clearly have understood the overall effect of the resolution as
denouncing hate crimes.97 Additionally, Judge Noonan said, the
court did not take seriously the idea that the Board’s statements
could have influenced media organizations to refuse to run the
religious groups’ advertisements, as the groups had alleged.98 In
short, according to Judge Noonan, the religious groups were
entitled to the benefit of the doubt on some of these issues; it was
not appropriate for the court to decide such questions at the onset of
the litigation.
Similarly, in Catholic League, the court’s affirmation of the
district court’s decision was premature. Although the court was
arguably justified in its findings that the resolution had a plausible
secular purpose and did not create excessive entanglement, its
analysis of the primary-effects factor cannot withstand scrutiny. As
discussed previously, the court’s reasoning under that prong of the
test appears to have been outcome-driven; it did not directly examine
the issue. Instead of considering that the resolution truly had a
primary religious effect, the court just assumed that an objective
observer knowing the focus, intent, and history of the Board’s
actions would have understood that the resolution’s message was not
primarily religious.99
What the court should have done, and what it was obligated to
do, was draw all inferences in favor of Catholic League. Given the
resolution’s language, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the
effects of the resolution may well have been primarily religious. The
resolution directly singled out the Catholic religion, stating that its
beliefs on adoption were an “insult” to San Franciscans, that they
were “absolutely unacceptable,” and that “such hateful and
discriminatory rhetoric is both insulting and callous, and shows a
level of insensitivity and ignorance which has seldom been
encountered.”100 This kind of language appeared throughout the
resolution. If the Board had not filled the resolution with such
angry, inflammatory language, the primary effects could have more
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1126–27.
Id. at 1127.
Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 605–06.
Id. at 597–98.
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easily been inferred as secular, consistent with the Board’s claimed
purpose. But because the resolution went well beyond simply
encouraging adoption by same-sex couples and instead resorted to
attacking specific religious beliefs, its primary effects are subject to
question. The court’s analysis would have been more appropriate in
the context of a properly supported motion for summary judgment
where discovery had been conducted and documented by affidavit.
In the context of a pleadings-based motion to dismiss, however, the
court was required to resolve the question in favor of Catholic
League.
VI. CONCLUSION
A close examination of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Catholic
League reveals that the case was incorrectly decided. The court
applied a flawed test that does not lend itself well to neutral
application, used that test to conduct an outcome-driven analysis,
and failed to adhere to the correct legal standard. Whether these
issues were ignored intentionally or simply overlooked by the court,
the result is the same: the Ninth Circuit struck a blow at religion in
the ongoing culture war. Moreover, the damage done to religious
freedoms is almost as concerning as the damage the court has
potentially done to its own legitimacy by abandoning its role of
neutrality.
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